But the arrival of the new members in the EU will modify the character of JHA cooperation by increasing the numbers of actors involved in the framing and the implementation of policies, changing the pattern of the problems confronted and shifting the location of the external frontier. The new members may be expected to have different perspectives to those of existing members on, inter alia , asylum and immigration policy, the significance of the external frontier, and the methods of transborder crime control.
These different perspectives could have the positive effect of promoting a more flexible and open Union. This openness will or should go with the grain of a developing common foreign and security policy which aims to promote good neighbourliness with states across the eastern external frontier. Alternatively, there may be negative effects such as promoting strains between member states, particularly since new member states have had no part in framing policies which they have to implement, and creating a new exclusive border to the east.
The Amsterdam Treaty and the follow-up documents mark an important stage in Justice and Home Affairs but many systems for cooperation in law enforcement cooperation and mutual legal assistance were already in place before The complex and dense network of cooperative arrangements and legislation — global, European Community and European Intergovernmental, multilateral and bilateral — with built in dynamics of their own, are little understood outside specialist circles.
Up to two hundred legislative measures in the field of JHA could be enacted within the next decade. New EU structures risk further complicating an already complex picture. The aim of the CEPS programme is to propose policy directions adapted to an enlarged Union which would avoid —. Conflict of policy objectives is the consequence of several factors which will be identified — inadvertence on the part of political decision makers, unintended conseque nces of policy introducing or strengthening one instrument of policy may create difficulties for either the policy concerned or for other policies.
These values are further elaborated in the draft Charter of Fundamental Rights. There is also a clear value shift in terms of the agenda and workload of the Council of Ministers in which JHA, directly or indirectly, takes a greater proportion than any other policy area. Policy proposals will be evaluated in the light of these values.
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The impact on the treatment of third country nationals, in which practices of member states have been less than exemplary, is of particular interest in this context an EU recommendation on the treatment of asylum seekers and conditions of detention is forthcoming. Also these values accord with the general support of human rights across frontiers and the refusal systematically to consider third countries as a source of threats and as potential enemies.
The method is to select certain key policy areas and a restricted group of candidate countries for analysis. General questions some of which have already been posed in the scholarly literature and in parliamentary enquiries are asked about the policy areas before engaging the detail of policies and policy proposals. Examples, with illustrative questions, are —. The posing of these and other questions is a preliminary to making specific policy proposals.
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The vast compass of JHA requires that a broad inter-disciplinary network is established to draw on the expertise of practitioners, lawyers, political scientists, economists and historians from candidate and member states. It is intended to embark on this early in Terms and Conditions Privacy Policy Contact us. Context The candidate states are adopting or are preparing to adopt EU systems such as Europol, Schengen the totality of the acquis have to be accepted according to art. The aim of the CEPS programme is to propose policy directions adapted to an enlarged Union which would avoid — conflict with other objectives of policy the inevitable public disillusionment if few practical results flow from general declarations of policy erroneous policies based on some widely believed but grossly exaggerated external threat e.
Examples, with illustrative questions, are — Border controls Is the existing border control regime effective for an enlarged European Union in achieving the stated aims of policy? Is the Schengen acquis sufficiently flexible for the new borders? Is a European border police or border control authority practical and desirable?
What other measures may be available to promote burden sharing? This, far from being Russia-centric, has consistently focused on carving out a respected role for Warsaw in Europe and a leading role in the region as well as on prodding Poland's Eastern neighbours — Belarus and Ukraine — towards democracy.
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A confrontation with Moscow might have undermined this policy. The priorities of the new accession countries' foreign policies are different with the result that they may not follow Poland's path. On the other hand, NATO may benefit from acquiring a more finely tuned "Russia" radar, informed by the knowledge and experience of some of those countries that know Moscow best.
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One can safely assume that Moscow's continued search for its own identity will involve forays in both foreign and domestic affairs that most European states would deem unacceptable. On recent such occasions, neither the European Union nor NATO has succeeded in crafting a principled common response, one that might deter similar behaviour in the future. Russia's importance in the campaign against terrorism, its mineral resources, and its dominant role in the region simply offer Moscow too many opportunities to discourage criticism and to sow discord among its counterparts.
The new members might help restore some balance to the relationship.
The Baltic states in particular are far more focused on Russia than any of the old Allies, and also less likely to be willing to compromise. The challenge for NATO will be to avoid giving in to irrational fears while tapping into the energy and the focus of the new members' policies towards Moscow.
Getting the balance right will be important, all the more so because of the attention that Russia has given to enlargement. The defining event of spring may turn out to have had little to do with the Alliance directly. A few weeks after NATO enlarged, the European Union opened its doors to ten new members, including eight former communist countries.
If these countries manage to make their voice heard in Brussels, they could play an important role in defining Europe's relationship with Washington and, in turn, the European Union's relationship with NATO. So-called "common" foreign and security policies were, until recently at least, essentially arrived at by collating the compatible parts of individual member states' positions. The EU foreign policy and security apparatus in Brussels exercised little influence over member states' policies and was not in a position to create policies of its own. This situation is currently changing and the focus on creating policies is slowly shifting to Brussels.
It was still largely built by mining the various member states' policies for common positions, but for the first time, in a modest but symbolically important way, it pushed a number of EU countries towards a security philosophy which they might not have embraced of their own volition. The document has been described by an insider as 90 per cent descriptive and 10 per cent prescriptive.
While 10 per cent may not appear much, it would have been unthinkable a few years ago. It seems to herald the era of mixed responsibility for European defence, with policies still mostly made in and implemented by member states, but increasingly circumscribed and sometimes prescribed by interests defined at the level of What is not yet known is the exact form of the future Brussels contribution to this process. To others, less America in Europe is the whole point.
For yet another group of countries, EU foreign and security policies are an institution-building exercise with little relation to defence. These competing visions conceal very different outcomes for the future shape of relations between the two sides of the Atlantic, and the eventual result could be a profoundly different EU-NATO relationship. The new EU members come to the debate over Europe's security policy late. They were largely absent from earlier discussions when many of the blueprints for ESDP were drawn up.
Indeed, in alone, the European Union adopted its Security Strategy , inaugurated a Rapid Reaction Force and launched its first two military missions. In practical terms, "indivisibility" tends to translate into coordinated threat assessments, preference for joint operations and a common set of planning standards for the expeditionary portions of countries' armed forces. It implies the continuation of the transatlantic alliance in its real sense — doing things for others that one would not normally do.
The new Allies are most clear on the need for an ongoing US role in European security.
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The EU discourse on this point covers quite a range, from heartfelt desire to keep NATO and the United States in the centre of Europe's defence plans to suggestions that the United States could — or perhaps should — leave the business of defending the continent. The new Allies seem firmly and unequivocally to favour the former vision. While the new members have articulated their views clearly, their ability — or even their desire — effectively to influence the European Union's security agenda is an open question. The governments in Bratislava, Budapest, Prague and elsewhere have tended to view EU integration as essentially a passive process, one of identifying EU consensus and reshaping their policies to fit the mould.
On many issues, however, and on defence in particular this is the wrong approach. Europe's security identity is only now being formed and the EU and NATO enlargements present a unique opportunity for the new members to help shape it. Right time, right place. The meaning of enlargement.