Here's the harder news: This is where the ethics part comes in, since we have to actively cultivate and nurture our better qualities through hexis habit-building, practice and action. This sounds a lot like our very ripped, very scary spin instructor telling us to "move it or lose it. But there's some really uplifting stuff in ol' Aristotle's Ethics.
For one thing, he says that happiness can't be achieved in solitude. This is Aristotle's way of telling us that girls' nights and bro hangs aren't just fun—they're basically mandatory. And that's just where it starts. Aristotle knows that humans are political creatures—and by that he means not that we love to rock an "I Voted" sticker on election days, but that we live in communities and rely on common laws and exchange to thrive. So it's not just friendships that are important to cultivating virtue, but also business transactions, lawmaking, and governance.
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We know from experience that behaving virtuously is pretty challenging—from the first time we pinched our baby brother just to hear him squeak, to that time when lying to get out of that speeding ticket just seemed like the best course of action "But officer—our dog is at an emergency vet appointment! And Aristotle's work confirms this. And while doing the right thing gives us pleasure and can bring affirmation from the people around us you know you feel good when you give a truly excellent birthday present it can also be a thankless job that causes us serious pain.
This is where balance comes in. Aristotle says that the person who finds the right balance between the extremes of their character traits—or the "golden mean"—will be a good and just person. And such a person gets an extra perk, even if the work is hard and thankless: Aristotle may be old, but he isn't a curmudgeon. He understands that in order to be happy, humans really do need to have some fun. In his world, pleasure is tops. And he's not being stodgy and talking about, say, the pleasure of feeling virtuous.
It also yes includes sex and eating Flamin' Hot Cheetos. But don't turn off your brain. Because in the end, the thing that makes us fully human—and therefore, the thing that's the best at making us happy—is thinking. Basically, the point of acting virtuously is to become more like ourselves. Aristotle calls the origin of virtues our "characteristics," and by helping those virtues shine, we're actually awakening our proper nature as human beings.
And the thing that marks us out as human, in Aristotle's theories, is rational perception. Being able to contemplate our own existence and know that it's awesome is a great pleasure reserved only for us. Cultivating our inner philosopher, then, is the key to a rewarding and happy life. You heard it here first and we heard it from Aristotle —enjoy your buddies, your doughnut holes and your bubbles baths…but don't forget to get your philosophy on. You didn't actually believe we were done, did you? If we've learned anything from ol' Aristotle and we have, because we live in a society based, in many ways, on his thoughts and teachings , it's that a two-word answer never suffices.
And this is for good reason. Not only did he revolutionize systematic thinking back in the 4th Century B. His observations of human interaction and behavior are insanely, stunningly perceptive—his work prompts us to think about the overarching systems of thought that rule the way we perceive our place in the universe. And in terms of Ethics , Aristotle couldn't have picked a topic that would resonate with Western culture more profoundly than the pursuit of happiness. We're obsessed with things like personal fulfillment, life balance, and finding our bliss.
And it is a moderation, firstly, inasmuch as it comes in the middle or mean between two vices, one on the side of excess, the other on the side of defect; Peters These and all other like things are blamed as being bad in themselves, and not merely in their excess or deficiency.
It is impossible therefore to go right in them; they are always wrong: For, to put it generally, there cannot be moderation in excess or deficiency, nor excess or deficiency in moderation. It is with particulars that conduct is concerned: These particulars then [ i. But defectiveness in the matter of these pleasures is hardly ever found, and so this sort of people also have as yet received no name: But both vices exceed and fall short in giving and taking in contrary ways: For the present we are but giving an outline or summary, and aim at nothing more; we shall afterwards treat these points in greater detail.
A man may have a due desire for honour, and also more or less than a due desire: And on this account those who occupy the extremes lay claim to the middle place. And in common parlance, too, the moderate man is sometimes called ambitious and sometimes unambitious, and sometimes the ambitious man is praised and sometimes Peters Why this is we will explain afterwards; for the present we will follow out our plan and enumerate the other types of character.
The characters themselves hardly have recognized names, but as the moderate man is here called gentle, we will call his character gentleness; of those who go into extremes, we may take the term wrathful for him who exceeds, with wrathfulness for the vice, and wrathless for him who is deficient, with wrathlessness for his character. They all have to do with intercourse in speech and action, but they differ in that one has to do with the truthfulness of this intercourse, while the other two have to do with its pleasantness—one of the two with pleasantness in matters of amusement, the other with pleasantness in all the relations of Edition: We must therefore speak of these qualities also in order that we may the more plainly see how, in all cases, moderation is praiseworthy, while the extreme courses are neither right nor praiseworthy, but blamable.
In these cases also names are for the most part wanting, but we must try, here as elsewhere, to coin names ourselves, in order to make our argument clear and easy to follow. With regard to pleasantness in the other affairs of life, he who makes himself properly pleasant may be called friendly, and his moderation friendliness; he that exceeds may be called obsequious if he have no ulterior motive, but a flatterer if he has an eye to his own advantage; he that is deficient in this respect, and always makes himself disagreeable, may be called a quarrelsome or peevish fellow.
These have to do with feelings of pleasure and pain at what happens to our neighbours. A man is called righteously indignant when he feels pain at the sight of undeserved prosperity, but your envious man goes beyond him and is pained by the sight of any one in prosperity, while the malevolent man is so far from being pained that he actually exults in the misfortunes of his neighbours. As for justice, the term is used in more senses than one; we will, therefore, after disposing of the above questions, distinguish these various senses, and show how each of these kinds of justice is a kind of moderation.
Now, each is in a way opposed to each, for the extreme dispositions are opposed both Edition: Just as a quantity which is equal to a given quantity is also greater when compared with a less, and less when compared with a greater quantity, so the mean or moderate dispositions exceed as compared with the defective dispositions, and fall short as compared with the excessive dispositions, both in feeling and in action; e.
by Aristotle
One is the reason derived from the nature of the matter itself: Another reason lies in ourselves: Thus any one can be angry—that is quite easy; any one can give money away or spend it: And secondly we must consider, each for himself, what we are most prone to—for different natures are inclined to different things—which we may learn by Peters And then we must bend ourselves in the opposite direction; for by keeping well away from error we shall fall into the middle course, as we straighten a bent stick by bending it the other way.
But it is a hard task, we must admit, especially in a particular case. It is not easy to determine, for instance, how and with whom one ought to be angry, and upon what grounds, and for how long; for public opinion sometimes praises those who fall short, and calls them gentle, and sometimes applies the term manly to those who show a harsh temper.
But it is hardly possible to determine by reasoning how far or to what extent a man must err in order to incur Edition: Such matters lie within the region of particulars, and can only be determined by perception. It seems, therefore, that a clear distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary is necessary for Peters For they are desired or chosen at the time when they are done, and the end or motive of an act is that which is in view at the time. Now, he wills the act at the time; for the cause which sets the limbs going lies in the agent in such cases, and where the cause lies in the agent, it rests with him to do or not to do.
Such acts, then, are voluntary, though in themselves [or apart from these qualifying circumstances] we may allow them to be involuntary; for no one would choose anything of this kind on its own account. But in some cases we do not praise, but pardon, i. I think our answer must be that, in the first place, Edition: It is scarcely possible, however, to lay down rules for determining which of two alternatives is to be preferred; for there are many differences in the particular cases. For instance, when a man is drunk or in a rage he is not thought Edition: These are the grounds of pity and pardon; for he who is ignorant of any of these particulars acts involuntarily.
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They are—first, the doer; secondly, the deed; and, thirdly, the object or person affected by it; sometimes also that wherewith e. But a man may be ignorant of what he is doing; e. Again, one might kill a man with a drug intended to save him, or hit him hard when one wished merely to touch him as boxers do when they spar with open hands. Interpreted in the latter sense, it is surely ridiculous, as the cause of both is the same. For it seems to be most intimately connected with virtue, and to be a surer test of character than action itself. For children and other animals have will, but not choice or purpose; and acts done upon the spur of the moment are said to be voluntary, but not to be done with deliberate purpose.
In the first place, choice is not shared by irrational creatures, but appetite and anger are. Again, the object of appetite [or aversion] is the pleasant or the painful, but the object of purpose [as such] is neither painful nor pleasant. But, further, it is not identical with a particular kind of opinion. For our choice of good or evil Edition: Again, we choose a thing when we know well that it is good; we may have an opinion about a thing of which we know nothing.
It seems, as we said, that what is chosen or purposed is willed, but that what is willed is not always chosen or purposed. The name itself, too, seems to indicate this, implying that something is chosen before or in preference to other things. The reason why we do not deliberate about these things is that none of them are things that we can ourselves effect. And these are the only things that remain; for besides nature and necessity and chance, the only remaining cause of change is reason and human agency in general. Though we must add that men severally deliberate about what they can themselves do.
We deliberate, then, about things that are brought about by our own agency, but not always in the same way; e. In important matters we call in advisers, distrusting our own powers of judgment. A physician does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall persuade, nor a statesman whether he shall make a good system of laws, nor a man in any other profession about his end; but, having the proposed end in view, we consider how and by what means this end can be attained; and if it appear that it can be attained by various means, we further consider which is the easiest and best; but if it can only be attained by one means, we consider how it is to be attained by this means, and how this means itself is to be secured, and so on, until we come to the first link in the chain of causes, which is last in the order of discovery.
For in deliberation we seem to inquire and to analyze in the way described, just as we analyze a geometrical figure in order to learn how to construct Peters By possible I mean something that can be done by us; and what can be done by our friends can in a manner be done by us; for it is we who set our friends to work. And if he goes on deliberating for ever he will never come to a conclusion. For we always stop in our inquiry how to do a thing when we have traced back the chain of causes to ourselves, and to the commanding part of ourselves; for this is the part that chooses.
The good man, then, wishes for the real object of wish; but what the bad man wishes for may be anything whatever; just as, with regard to the body, those who are in good condition find those things healthy that are really healthy, while those who are diseased find other things healthy and it is just the same with things bitter, sweet, hot, heavy, etc. What misleads people seems to be in most cases pleasure; it seems to be a good thing, even when it is Peters So they choose what is pleasant as good, and shun pain as evil. Actions that are concerned with means, then, will be guided by choice, and so will be voluntary.
But the acts in which the virtues are manifested are concerned with means. For where it lies with us to do, it lies with us not to do. Where we can say no, we can say yes. If then the doing a deed, which is noble, lies with us, the not doing it, which is disgraceful, lies with us; and if the not doing, which is noble, lies with us, the doing, which is disgraceful, Peters But if the doing and likewise the not doing of noble or base deeds lies with us, and if this is, as we found, identical with being good or bad, then it follows that it lies with us to be worthy or worthless men.
But no one encourages us to do that which does not depend on ourselves, and which is not voluntary: Again, ignorance of any of the ordinances of the law, which a man ought to know and easily Peters And so in Edition: We reply that men are themselves responsible for acquiring such a character by a dissolute life, and for being unjust or profligate in consequence of repeated acts of wrong, or of spending their time in drinking and so on.
For it is repeated acts of a particular kind that give a man a particular character. But if a man knowingly does acts which must make Peters And it may be that he is voluntarily sick, through living incontinently and disobeying the doctor. At one time, then, he had the option not to be sick, but he no longer has it now that he has thrown away his health. When you have discharged a stone it is no longer in your power to call it back; but nevertheless the throwing and Edition: Just so the unjust or the profligate man at the beginning was free not to acquire this character, and therefore he is voluntarily unjust or profligate; but now that he has acquired it, he is no longer free to put it off.
We do not censure natural ugliness, but we do censure that which is due to negligence and want of exercise. And so with weakness and infirmity: And if this be so, then in other fields also those vices that are blamed must depend upon ourselves. If, I answer, each man be in some way responsible for his habits or character, then in some way he must be responsible for this appearance also. But if this be not the case, then a man is not responsible for, or is not the cause of, his own evil doing, but it is through ignorance of the end that he does evil, fancying that thereby he will secure the greatest good: Now, granting this to be true, how will virtue be any more voluntary than vice?
But our particular acts are not voluntary in the same sense as our habits: Inasmuch, however, as it lay with us to employ or not to employ our faculties in this way, the resulting characters are on that account voluntary. And, first of all, let us take courage.
There are things which we actually ought to fear, which it is noble to fear and base not to fear, e. He who fears disgrace is an honourable man, with a due sense of shame, while he who fears it not is shameless though some people stretch the word courageous so far as to apply it to him; for he has a certain resemblance to the courageous man, courage Peters Poverty, perhaps, we ought not to fear, nor disease, nor generally those things that are not the result of vice, and do not depend upon ourselves. But still to be fearless in regard to these things is not strictly courage; though here also the term is sometimes applied in virtue of a certain resemblance.
There are people, Edition: Surely in the greatest; for no one is more able to endure what is terrible. But of all things the most terrible is death; for death is our limit, and when a man is once dead it seems that there is no longer either good or evil for him. Surely on the noblest occasions: Such things, then, inspire fear in every rational man. But the fearful things that a man may face differ in importance and in being more or less fearful and so with the things Peters Now, the courageous man always keeps his presence of mind so far as a man can.
And thus men err sometimes by fearing the wrong things, sometimes by fearing in the wrong manner or at the wrong time, and so on. For the courageous man regulates both his feeling and his action according to the merits of each case and as reason bids him. Therefore the end or motive of his courage is also noble; for everything takes its character from its end.
It is from a noble motive, therefore, that the courageous man endures and acts courageously in each particular case. He that is over-confident in the presence of Peters But the foolhardy man is generally thought to be really a braggart, and to pretend a courage which he has not: And so your foolhardy man is generally a coward at bottom: He is also deficient in confidence; but his character rather displays itself in excess of fear in the presence of pain. But it is the contrary with the courageous man; for confidence implies hopefulness. But to seek death as a refuge from poverty, or love, or any painful thing, is not the act of a brave man, but of a coward.
For it is effeminacy thus to fly from vexation; and in such a case death is accepted not because it is noble, but simply as an escape from evil. But besides this there are five other kinds of courage so called. Citizens seem often to face dangers because of legal pains and penalties on the one hand, and honours on the other. And on this account the people seem to be most courageous in those states where cowards are disgraced and brave men honoured.
But a man ought to be courageous, not under compulsion, but because it is noble to be so. This sort of courage is exhibited by various persons in various matters, but notably by regular troops in military affairs; for it seems that in war there are many occasions of groundless alarm, and with these the regulars are better acquainted; so they appear to be courageous, simply because the other troops do not understand the real state of the case.
So they fight with the advantage of armed over unarmed men, or of trained over untrained men; for in athletic contests also it is not the bravest men that can fight best, but those who are strongest and have their bodies in the best order. But that is not what we mean by courageous. And so beasts are not courageous, since it is pain and rage that drives them to rush on danger, without foreseeing any of the terrible consequences.
If this be courage, then asses must be called courageous when they are hungry; for though you beat them they will not leave off eating. Adulterers also are moved to do many bold deeds by their lust. However, this kind of courage, whose impulse is rage, seems to be the most natural, and, when deliberate purpose and the right motive are added to it, to become real courage.
Again, anger is a painful state, the act of revenge is pleasant; but those who fight from these motives [ i. The two resemble one another, since both are confident; but whereas the courageous man is confident for the reasons specified above, the sanguine man is confident because he thinks he is superior and will win without Peters People behave in the same sort of way when they get drunk; for then they become sanguine.
But when he finds that this is not the case, he runs away; while it is the character of the courageous man, as we saw, to face that which is terrible to a man even when he sees the danger, because it is noble to do so and base not to do so. When we see what is coming we may choose to meet Edition: And so while the latter hold their ground for some time, the former, whose courage was due to a false belief, run away the moment they perceive or suspect that the case is different; as the Argives did when they engaged the Spartans under the idea that they were Sicyonians.
Courage, therefore, brings pain, and is justly praised; for it is harder to endure what is painful than to abstain from what is pleasant. Boxers, for instance, have a pleasant end in view, that for which they strive, the crown and the honours; but the blows they receive are grievous to flesh and blood, and painful, and so are all the labours they undergo; and as the latter are many, while the end is small, the pleasantness of the end is hardly apparent.
And the more he is endowed with every virtue, and the happier he is, the more grievous will death be to him; for life is more worth living to a man of his sort than to any one else, and he deprives himself knowingly of the very best things; and it is painful to do that. But he is no less courageous because he feels this pain; nay, we may say he is even more courageous, because in spite of it he chooses noble conduct in battle in preference to those good things. We have already said that temperance is moderation or observance of the mean with regard to pleasures for it is not concerned with pains so much, nor in the same manner ; profligacy also manifests itself in the same field.
When he who loves honour or learning is delighted by that which he loves, it is not his body that is affected, but his mind. But men are not called either temperate or profligate for their behaviour with regard to these pleasures; nor for their behaviour with regard to any other pleasures that are not of the body. For instance, those who are fond of gossip and of telling stories, and spend their days in trifles, are called babblers, but not profligate; nor do we apply this term to those who are pained beyond measure at the loss of money or friends.
We do not say that those who delight in the smell of fruit or roses or incense are profligate, but rather those who delight in the smell of unguents and savoury dishes; for the profligate delights in these smells because they remind him of the things that he lusts after. It is not the scent of a hare that delights a dog, but the eating of it; only the announcement comes through his sense of smell. The lion rejoices not in the lowing of the ox, but in the devouring of him; but as the lowing announces that the ox is near, the lion appears to delight in the sound itself.
So also, it is not seeing a stag or a wild goat that pleases him, but the anticipation of a meal. For it is the function of taste to distinguish flavours, as is done by winetasters and by those who season dishes; but it is by no means this discrimination of objects that gives delight to profligates, at any rate , but the actual enjoyment of them, the medium of which is always the sense of touch, alike in the pleasures of eating, of drinking, and of sexual intercourse.
That sense, then, with which profligacy is concerned is of all senses the commonest or most widespread; and so profligacy would seem to be deservedly of all vices the most censured, inasmuch as it attaches not to our human, but to our animal nature. And further, the more manly sort even of the pleasures of touch are excluded from the sphere of profligacy, such as the pleasures which the gymnast finds in rubbing and the warm bath; for the profligate does not cultivate the sense of touch over his whole body, but in certain parts only.
Thus the desire of food is natural [or common to the race]; every man when he is in want desires meat or drink, or sometimes both, and sexual intercourse, as Homer says, when he is young and vigorous. Of course it is also partly natural: Whereas people are called fond of this or that because they delight either in wrong things, or to an unusual degree, or in a wrong fashion, profligates exceed in all these ways.
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For they delight in some things in which they ought not to delight since they are hateful things , and if it be right to delight in any of these things they delight in them more than is right and more than is usual. But in respect of the corresponding pains the case Edition: And so he is constantly pained by failing to get them and by lusting after them: And indeed even the lower animals discriminate kinds of food, and delight in some and not in others; and a being to whom nothing was pleasant, and who found no difference between one thing and another, would be very far removed from being a man.
We have no name for such a being, because he does not exist. He takes no pleasure in those things that the profligate most delights in but rather disdains Edition: For a man is impelled to the former by pleasure, to the latter by pain; but pleasure is a thing we choose, Peters Pain puts us beside ourselves and upsets the nature of the sufferer, while pleasure has no such effect. Profligacy, therefore, is more voluntary. Profligacy is for these reasons more to be blamed than cowardice, and for another reason too, viz. It is not Edition: It makes no difference for our present purpose which of the two is named after the other, but it is plain that the later is named after the earlier.
Now, these characteristics are nowhere so strongly marked as in appetite and in childhood; children too [as well as the profligate] live according to their appetites, and the desire for pleasant things is Peters If then this element be not submissive and obedient to the governing principle, it will make great head: The gratifications of appetite, Edition: What we commend in a liberal man is his behaviour, not in war, nor in those circumstances in which temperance is commended, nor yet in passing judgment, but in the giving and taking of wealth, and especially Peters Illiberality always means caring for wealth more than is right; but prodigality sometimes stands for a combination of vices.
Thus incontinent people, who squander their money in riotous living, are called Peters And so prodigals are held to be very worthless individuals, as they combine a number of vices. But we must remember that this is not the proper Peters But each thing is best used by him who has the virtue that is concerned with that thing. And so it is more distinctive of the liberal man to give to the right people than to take from the right source and not to take from the wrong source.
For it is more distinctive of virtue to do good to others than to have good done to you, and to do what is noble than not to do what is base. Again, we are thankful to him who gives, not to him who does not take; and so also we praise the former rather than the latter. Again, of all virtuous characters the liberal man is perhaps the most beloved, because he is useful; but his usefulness lies in his giving. The liberal man, therefore, like the others, will give with a view to, or for the sake of, that which is noble, and give rightly; i. And so he will not neglect his property, since he wishes by means of it to help others.
But he will refuse to give to any casual person, in order that he may have wherewithal to give to the right persons, at the right times, and where it is noble to give. And so it is quite possible that the giver of the smaller sum may be the more liberal man, if his means be smaller. It is not easy for a liberal man to be rich, as he is not apt to take or to keep, but is apt to spend, and cares for money not on its own account, but only for the sake of giving it away. But this is natural enough; for it is just as impossible to have wealth without taking trouble about it, as it is to have anything else.
For, as we have already said, he is liberal who spends in proportion to his fortune, on proper objects, while he who exceeds this is prodigal. For since the virtue is moderation in both giving and taking, the man who has the virtue will do both rightly. Right taking is consistent with right giving, but any other taking is contrary to it. Those givings and takings, then, that are consistent with one another are found in the same person, while those that are contrary to one another manifestly are not.
Prodigality exceeds in giving and in not taking, but falls short in taking; illiberality falls short in giving, but exceeds in taking—in small things, we must add. For he is easily cured by advancing years and by lack of means, and may come to the middle course. For he has the essential points of the liberal character; he gives and abstains from taking, though he does neither well nor as he ought. If then he can be trained to this, or if in any other way this change in his nature can be effected, he will be liberal; for then he will give to whom he ought, and will not take whence he ought not.
And so he is generally thought to be not a bad character; for to go too far in giving and in not taking does not show a vicious or ignoble nature so much as a foolish one. They become grasping because they wish to spend, but cannot readily do so, as their supplies soon fail. So they are compelled to draw from other sources. At the same time, since they care nothing for what is noble, they will take quite recklessly from any source whatever; for they long to give, but care not a whit how the money goes or whence it comes. Sometimes they enrich those who ought to be poor, and will give Edition: And thus the greater part of them are profligates; for, being ready to part with their money, they are apt to lavish it on riotous living, and as they do not shape their lives with a view to that which is noble, they easily fall away into the pursuit of pleasure.
It also runs in the blood more than prodigality; the generality of men are more apt to be fond of money than of giving. It consists of two parts—deficiency in giving, and excess of taking; but it is not always found in its entirety; sometimes the parts are separated, and one man exceeds in taking, while another falls short Peters Some are impelled to this conduct by a kind of honesty, or desire to avoid what is disgraceful—I mean that some of them seem, or at any rate profess, to be saving, in order that they may never be compelled to do anything disgraceful; e.
Others, again, exceed in the matter of taking so far as to make any gain they can in any way whatever, e. For all these make money from improper sources to an improper extent. The dice-sharper, however, and the man who steals clothes at the bath, or the common thief, are reckoned among the illiberal; for they all make base gains; i. Both then, wishing to make gain in improper ways, are seekers of base gain; and all such ways of making money are illiberal.
For this also seems to be a virtue that is concerned with wealth. But it does not, like liberality, extend over the whole field of money transactions, but only over those that involve large expenditure; and in these it goes beyond liberality in largeness. But the largeness is relative: What is suitable, then, is relative to the person, Peters Yet he who spends what is fitting on trifling or moderately important occasions is not called magnificent; e. For the magnificent man is liberal, but a man may be liberal without being magnificent. But we will speak of them presently.
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For, as we said at the outset, a habit or type of character takes its complexion from the acts in which it issues and the things it produces. What he produces then will also be of the same nature; for only thus will the expense be at once great and suitable to the result. The result, then, must be proportionate to the expenditure, and the expenditure proportionate to the result, or even greater.
He will inquire how the work can be made most beautiful and most elegant, rather than what its cost will be, and how it can be done most cheaply. For the excellence of a possession is not the same as the excellence of a product or work of art: But such expenditure is becoming in those who have got the requisite means, either by their own efforts or through their ancestors or their connections, and who have birth and reputation, etc.
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And he will spend money more readily on things that last; for these Peters And on each occasion he will spend what is suitable—which is not the same for gods as for men, for a temple as for a tomb. The man who exceeds whom we call vulgar exceeds, as we said, in spending improperly. He spends great sums on little objects, and makes an unseemly display; e. And all this he will do from no desire for what is noble or beautiful, but merely to display his wealth, because he hopes thereby to gain admiration, spending little where he should spend much, and much where he should spend little.
The man we have described, then, is high-minded. For desert has reference to external good things. Now, the greatest of external good things we may assume to be that which we render to the Gods as their due, and that which people in high stations most desire, and which is the prize appointed for the noblest deeds. But the thing that answers to this description is honour, which, we may safely say, is the greatest of all external goods.
Honours and dishonours, therefore, are the field in which the high-minded man behaves as he ought. The really high-minded man, therefore, must be a good or excellent man. And indeed greatness in every virtue or excellence would seem to be necessarily implied in being a high-minded or great-souled man.
Survey him point by point and you will find that the notion of a high-minded man that is not a good or excellent man is utterly absurd. Indeed, if he were not good, he could not be worthy of honour; for honour is the prize of virtue, and is rendered to the good as their due. And on this account it is a hard thing to be truly high-minded; for it is impossible without the union of all the virtues. But honour from ordinary men and on trivial grounds he will utterly despise; for that is not what he deserves.
And dishonour likewise he will make light of; for he will never merit it. But he who thinks lightly of honour must think lightly of them also. For those who are well born are thought worthy of honour, and those who are powerful or wealthy; for they are in a position of superiority, and that which is superior in any good thing is always held in greater honour. And so these things do make people more high-minded in a Peters But in strictness it is only the good man that is worthy of honour, though he that has both goodness and good fortune is commonly thought to be more worthy of honour.
Those, however, who have these good things without virtue, neither have any just claim to great things, nor are properly to be called high-minded; for neither is possible without complete virtue. For without virtue it is not easy to bear the gifts of fortune becomingly; and so, being unable to bear them, and thinking themselves superior to everybody else, such people look down upon others, and yet themselves do Edition: They imitate the high-minded man without being really like him, and they imitate him where they can; that is to say, they do not exhibit virtue in their acts, but they look down Peters For the high-minded man never looks down upon others without justice for he estimates them correctly , while most men do so for quite irrelevant reasons.
And when he has received a benefit, he is apt to confer a greater in return; for thus his creditor will become his debtor and be in the position of a recipient of his favour. He readily forgets injuries; for it is not consistent with his character to brood on the past, especially on past injuries, but rather to overlook them. Now these two also do not seem to be bad—for they do no harm—though they are in error. For the little-minded man, though he deserves good things, deprives himself of that which he deserves, and so seems to be the worse for not claiming these good things, and for misjudging himself; for if he judged right he would desire what he deserves, as it is good.
I do not mean to say that such people seem to be fools, but rather too retiring But a misjudgment of this kind does seem actually to make them worse; for men strive for that which they deserve, and shrink from noble deeds and employments of which they think themselves unworthy, as well as from mere external good things. Just as in the taking and giving of money it is possible to observe the mean, and also to exceed or fall short of it, so it is possible in desire for honour to go too far or not far enough, or, again, to desire honour from the right source and in the right manner.
It is plain, then, that there are various senses in which a man is said to be fond of a thing, and that the term fond of honour has not always the same sense, but that as a term of praise it means fonder than most men, and as a term of reproach it means fonder than is right. But, as there is no recognized term for the observance of the mean, the extremes fight, so to speak, for what seems an empty place. But wherever there is excess and defect there is also Peters Compared with ambition, it seems to be lack of ambition; compared with lack of ambition, it seems to be ambition; compared with both at once, it seems in a way to be both at once.
But in this case the extreme characters seem to be opposed to one another [instead of to the moderate character], because the character that observes the mean has no recognized name. But it must be noted that we have no recognized name for the mean, and scarcely any recognized names for the extremes. And so the term gentleness, which properly denotes an inclination towards deficiency in anger for which also we have no recognized name , is applied to the mean. But he seems to err rather on the side of deficiency; he is loth to take vengeance and very ready to forgive. Those who are not angered by what ought to anger them seem to be foolish, and so do those who are not angry as and Peters All these errors, however, are not found in the same person.
That would be impossible; for evil is self-destructive, and, if it appears in its entirety, becomes quite unbearable. And the reason is that they do not keep in their anger, but, through the quickness of their temper, at once retaliate, and so let Edition: For so soon as we retaliate we are relieved: Such men are exceedingly troublesome to themselves and their dearest friends. But what amount and kind of error makes a man blamable can scarcely be defined; for it depends upon the particular circumstances of each case, and can only be decided by immediate perception.
It is evident, therefore, that we must strive for the habit which observes the mean. Those who take the opposite line, and object to everything and never think for a moment what pain they may give, are called cross and contentious. For the man who exhibits this moderation is the same sort of man that we mean when we speak of an upright friend, except that Peters This differs from friendliness in that it does not imply emotion and affection for those with whom we associate; for he who has this quality acquiesces when he ought, not because he loves or hates, but because that is his character.
He will behave thus alike to those whom he knows and to those whom he does not know, to those with whom he is intimate and to those with whom he is not intimate, only that in each case he will behave as is fitting; for we are not bound to show the same consideration to strangers as to intimates, nor to take the same care not to pain them. It seems to be with the pleasures and pains of social intercourse that he is concerned.
Now, whenever he finds that it is not noble, or is positively hurtful to himself, to contribute to any of these pleasures, he will refuse to Edition: And if the pleasure is such as to involve discredit, and no slight discredit, or some injury to him who is the source of it, while his opposition will give a little pain, he will not acquiesce, but will set his face against Peters But he will behave differently according as he is in the company of great people or ordinary people, of intimate friends or mere acquaintances, and so on, rendering to each his due; preferring, apart from other considerations, to promote pleasure, and loth to give pain, but regulating his conduct by consideration of the consequences, if they be considerable—by consideration, I mean, of what is noble and fitting.
And thus for the sake of great pleasure in the future he will inflict a slight pain now. But he who sets his face against everything is, as we have already said, cross and contentious. But the extremes seem here to be opposed to one another [instead of to the mean], because there is no name for the mean. It will be as well to examine these qualities also; for we shall know more about human character, when Edition: We have already spoken of the characters that are displayed in social intercourse in the matter of pleasure and pain; let us now go on to speak in like manner of those who show themselves truthful or untruthful in what they say and do, and in the pretensions they put forward.
When he has no ulterior object in view, each man speaks and acts and lives according to his character. And so the truthful man, as observing the mean, is praiseworthy, while the untruthful characters are both blamable, but the boastful more than the ironical. For he who loves truth, and is truthful where nothing depends upon it, will still more surely tell the truth where serious interests are involved; he will shun falsehood as a base thing here, seeing that he shunned it elsewhere, apart from any consequences: And so it is usually something of this sort that men pretend to and boast of; for the conditions specified are realized in them.
And sometimes this self-depreciation is scarcely distinguishable from boasting, as for instance dressing like a Spartan; for there is something boastful in extreme depreciation as well as in exaggeration. While those who will never say anything laughable themselves, and frown on those who do, are considered boorish and morose. But that there is a difference, and a considerable difference, between the two is plain from what we have said. A man of tact will only say and listen to such things as it befits an honest man and a gentleman to say and listen to; for there are things that it is quite becoming for such a man to say and to listen to in the way of jest, and the jesting of a gentleman differs from that of a man of slavish nature, and the jesting of an educated from that of an uneducated man.
Nay, surely a jest that gives pleasure to the hearer is something quite indefinite, for different things are hateful and pleasant to different people. This then is the character of him who observes the mean, whether we call him a man of tact or a man of ready wit. The buffoon, on the other hand, cannot resist an opportunity for a joke, and, if he can but raise a laugh, will spare neither himself nor others, and will say things which no man of refinement would say, and some of which he would not even listen to. The boor, lastly, is wholly useless for this kind of intercourse; he contributes nothing, and takes everything Peters And yet recreation and amusement seem to be necessary ingredients in our life.
At least, it is Peters Both then seem to be in a way physical, which is held to be a mark Edition: And so we praise young men when they are ready to feel shame, but no one would praise a man of more advanced years for being apt to be ashamed; for we consider that he ought not to do anything which could make him ashamed of himself. Again, granting that it is bad to be shameless, or not to be ashamed to do shameful things, it does not therefore follow that it is good to do them and be ashamed of it.
And in this inquiry we will follow the same method as before. Let us lay this down, then, as an outline to work upon. I mean that whereas both of a pair of opposites come under the same science or power, a habit which produces a Edition: For instance, if good condition be firmness of flesh, it follows that bad condition is flabbiness of flesh, and that what tends to produce firmness of flesh conduces to good condition. Firstly, he who breaks the laws is considered unjust, and, secondly, he who takes more than his share, or the unfair man.
Plainly, then, a just man will mean 1 a law-abiding and 2 a fair man. A just thing then will be 1 that which is in accordance with the law, 2 that which is fair; and the unjust thing will be 1 that which is contrary to law, 2 that which is unfair. But in any case he is unfair; for this is a wider term which includes the other. Hence it follows that whatever is according to law is just in one sense of the word. The law bids us display courage as not to leave our ranks, or run, or throw away our arms , and temperance as not to commit adultery or outrage , and gentleness as not to strike or revile our neighbours , and so on with all the other virtues and vices, enjoining acts and forbidding them, rightly when it is a good law, not so rightly when it is a hastily improvised one.
It is complete virtue, first of all, because it is the exhibition of complete virtue: In the case of the other kinds of badness, the man who displays them, though he acts unjustly [in one sense of the word], yet does not take more than his share: But when he takes more than his share, he displays perhaps no one of these vices, nor does he display them all, yet he displays a kind of badness for we blame him , namely, injustice [in the second sense of the word].
Evidently, then, he would be called unjust because of his gain. We must therefore speak of justice and injustice, and of that which is just and that which is unjust, in this limited sense. It is easy also to see how we are to define that which is just and that which is unjust in their corresponding senses [according to law and contrary to law].
For the great bulk, we may say, of the acts which are according to law are the acts which the law commands with a view to complete virtue; for the law orders us to display all the virtues and none of the vices in our lives. As for the education of the individual as such, which tends to make him simply a good man, we may reserve the question whether it belongs to the science of the state or not; for it is possible that to be a good man is not the same as to be a good citizen of any state whatever.
Now, it is plain that there must be a mean which lies between what is unfair on this side and on that. But since that which is fair or equal is a mean between two extremes, it follows that what is just will be a mean. It follows, then, that that which is just is both a mean quantity and also a fair amount relatively to something else and to certain persons—in other words, that, on the one hand, as a mean quantity it implies certain other quantities, i. For if the persons be not equal, their shares will not be equal; and this is the source of disputes and accusations, when persons who are equal do not receive equal shares, or when persons who are not equal receive equal shares.
For not abstract numbers only, but all things that can be numbered, admit of proportion; proportion meaning equality of ratios, and requiring four terms at least. Continuous proportion also requires four terms: The term b then is repeated; and so, counting b twice over, we find that the terms of the proportion are four in number. The sums of these new pairs then will stand to one another in the original ratio [ i. That which is just, then, in this sense is that which is proportionate; but that which is unjust is that which is disproportionate.
In the latter case one quantity becomes more or too much, the other less or too little. And this we see in practice; for he who wrongs another gets too much, and he who is wronged gets too little of the good in Peters For that which is just in the distribution of a common stock of good things is always in accordance with the proportion above specified even when it is a common fund that has to be divided, the sums which the several participants take must bear the same ratio to one another as the sums they have put in , and that which is unjust in the corresponding sense is that which violates this proportion.
For it makes no difference whether a good man defrauds a bad one, or a bad man a good one, nor whether a man who commits an adultery be a good or a bad man; the law looks only to the difference created by the injury, treating the parties themselves as equal, and only asking whether the one has done, and the other suffered, injury or damage.
For even when one party is struck and the other strikes, or one kills and the other is killed, that which is suffered and that which is done Edition: What is fair or equal, then, is a mean between more or too much and less or too little; but gain and loss are both more or too much and less or too little in opposite ways, i. And in the mean between them, as we found, lies that which is equal or fair, which we say is just.
The Nicomachean Ethics
That which is just in the way of redress, then, is the mean between loss and gain. But the judge restores equality; it is as if he found a line divided into two unequal parts, and were to cut off from the greater that by which it exceeds the half, and to add this to the less. But when the whole is equally divided, the parties are said to have their own, each now receiving an equal or fair amount. For in voluntary exchange having more than your own is called gaining, and having less than you started with is called losing in buying and selling, I mean, and in the other transactions Edition: And so the Pythagoreans used to teach; for their definition of what is just was simply that what a man has done to another should be done to him.
For instance, if an officer strike a man, he ought not to be struck in return; and if a man strike an officer, he ought not merely to be struck, but to be punished. For the very existence of a state depends upon proportionate return. If men have suffered evil, they seek to return it; if not, if they cannot requite an injury, we count their condition slavish. And again, if men have received good, they seek to repay it: We ought to return the good offices of those who have been gracious to us, and then again to take the lead in good offices towards them.
For instance, let A stand for a builder, B for a shoemaker, C for a house, D for shoes. Now, the desired result will be brought about if requital take place after proportionate equality has first been established. If this be not done, there is no equality, and intercourse becomes impossible; for there is no reason why the work of the one should not be worth more than the work of the other. Their work, then, must be brought to an equality [or appraised by a common standard of value].
For it is not between two physicians that exchange of services takes place, but between a physician and a husbandman, and generally between persons of different professions and of unequal worth; these unequal persons, then, have to be reduced to equality [or measured by a common standard]. For this purpose money was invented, and serves as a medium of exchange; for by it we can measure everything, and so can measure the superiority and inferiority of different kinds of work—the number of shoes, for instance, that is equivalent to a house or to a certain quantity of food.
What is needed then is that so many shoes shall bear to a house or a measure of corn the same ratio that a builder [or a husbandman] bears to a shoemaker. If they could not requite each other in this way, interchange of services would be impossible. This article, then [the corn to be exported], must be made equal [to the wine that is imported]. Money is, indeed, subject to the same conditions as other things: Everything, then, must be assessed in money; for this enables men always to exchange their services, and so makes society possible.
Money, then, as a standard, serves to reduce things to a common measure, so that equal amounts of each may be taken; for there would be no society if there were no exchange, and no exchange if there were no equality, and no equality if it were not possible to reduce things to a common measure. In strictness, indeed, it is impossible to find any common measure for things so extremely diverse; but our needs give a standard which is sufficiently accurate for practical purposes.
Money makes all things commensurable, for all things are valued in money. We see at once, then, how many beds are equal to one house, viz. We see also that the virtue justice is a kind of moderation or observance of the mean, but not quite in the same way as the virtues hitherto spoken of. It does indeed choose a mean, but both the extremes fall under the single vice injustice. We see also that justice is that habit in respect of which the just man is said to be apt to do deliberately that which is just; that is to say, in dealings between himself and another or between two other parties , to apportion things, not so that he shall get more or too much, and his neighbour less or too little, of what is desirable, and conversely with what is disadvantageous, but so that each shall get his fair, that is, his proportionate share, and similarly in dealings between two other parties.
But of the two sides of the act of injustice, suffering is a lesser wrong than doing the injustice. Perhaps we ought to reply that there is no such difference in the acts. In such a case, then, a man acts unjustly, but is not unjust; e.