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A Light-Weight e-Voting System with Distributed Trust - ScienceDirect
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Terms and conditions apply. Subject to credit approval. Immediate payment required for this item. On May 22, , the U. The Role of Standards. I was joined on the invited panel by Dr. Doug Jones University of Iowa. A report issued by NIST, overviewing the session, is available at http: Some press coverage of the hearing can be found here. These hearings resulted in House Bill H. Eventually this bill was incorporated into H.
Details of the election legislation in the th Congress can be found here. This is discussed further in the California section below. The California State Elections Code contains a number of sections that are directly relevant to US and international electronic voting issues. Section requires that there be "a public manual tally of the ballots tabulated by those devices, including vote by mail voters' ballots, cast in 1 percent of the precincts chosen at random by the elections official. Unfortunately, as occurred in Nguyen v. Numerous YouTube courtroom videos from my 2 days of testimony in this matter can be found by using the search string: Using such systems, the voter has no way to confirm that the ballot they intended to cast is identical to the one recorded by the machine.
Hence, such recounts are only procedural in nature, and not truly validatory. Congress was similarly vague in their definition of "manual audit capacity" in the Help America Vote Act of Section a.
I have always maintained that the intention of HAVA, as well as the California Code, is to allow the voter to view the printed ballot prior to casting it. Finally, in , California's Secretary of State agreed but only after discovering that uncertified software was used in their Recall and General elections in with this interpretation.
Your participation is needed here -- if you are a voter living in a municipality that uses DREs with or without VVPATs , request an absentee ballot prior to the election so that you can cast your vote on paper.
Why electronic voting isn't secure – but may be safe enough
That is the only way you can be assured that a your vote was submitted as you intended and b the ballot you prepared will be available for a manual recount. I have been voting absentee since DREs replaced the lever machines in my County in This appeared as Case No. The Judge ruled on September 3, in favor of the State on the basis of only written testimony without deposition or cross-examination, and without providing an opportunity to inspect the voting systems in question although he criticized one witness for not having done so, even though it would likely have been a felony to perform such an examination in the absence of a court order , and various appeals also failed.
The ruling allowed other California counties to proceed with their purchases of self-auditing voting equipment. Despite this ruling, the subsequent Secretary of State, Kevin Shelley, decided on November 21, to require that all computerized voting equipment be equiped with an accessible voter verified paper trail by July All other Counties in CA use opscan. California Proposition 23, the None of the Above Ballot Option, failed to achieve enough votes to pass in the March 7, election. The lack of a "none of the above" choice for each ballot race in all states creates a dubious dark hole for election auditing.
The "lost vote" also called "undervote" or "residual vote" rate tends to differ depending on equipment and other factors, but it is often also an indicator of malfunction or tampering. The lack of a definitive "no vote" allows vendors and election officials to assert that votes were "not cast" when in fact votes have actually been lost. This situation is becoming more prevalent with the introduction of multiple recording devices within the voting machines, and no real way to determine which storage unit has the "correct" data.
It is unfortunate that the U. Green Party believes that the "none of the above" option is contrary to their interest in promoting proportional balloting, since they are among the most vocal opponents of this effective auditing requirement. Hastings College of the Law Library maintains a search engine for its extensive California Ballot Propositions Database , which is also helpful.
I was requested by the Democratic Recount Committee to provide a sworn affidavit regarding the necessity of a hand recount in the disputed Florida precincts. The testimony was presented as part of the defense brief in the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, Atlanta, November 17, The document is linked here as a pdf file, and can also obtained through direct request to the 11th Circuit Court.
Reference to this affidavit was made in Brief in opposition for respondents Gore et al. Footage of my demonstration showing that a selection could inadvertently be made without actually pressing the touchscreen at the candidate's name location, aired on 60 Minutes. Also revealed during the warehouse investigation was the fact that these voting machines were never manually checked for all combinations of candidate selections during the pre-election testing process. During , Florida outlawed the use of touchsreen voting having previously outlawed the hanging chad punchcard systems and now uses optical scanning throughout the state.
Unfortunately, in , Florida also outlawed the right of voters or candidates to be allowed to audit the electronically-generated results via a manual recount. Constitution and claiming that it was unconstitutional for 52 counties in Florida to have a means to conduct a recount, while the 15 touchscreen counties could not perform one. Thus there is no way to independently confirm that the scanners have been programmed correctly, are not experiencing anomalous conditions such as treating certain types of ink as invisible , and have not been tampered with as Hari Hursti showed can alter vote totals.
For all of these reasons plus others related to voter disenfranchisement , Florida continues to get an F in election integrity. From , I provided pro bono assistance for the Guciora v. The Plaintiff's Complaint and Brief can be found at the links here. I submitted extensive written testimony on October 16, that described numerous flaws with electronic voting systems lack of provability, malfunctioning that disenfranchises voters, less accuracy, vulnerability to insider attacks, lack of transparency, improper vendor responses to software flaws, inadequate certification, lack of independent ballot audit, and vendor misrepresentation.
My testimony in the remand hearing before Hon. Linda Feinberg, Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, largely focused on the inability of the vendors to provide a voter verified paper ballot add-on to the DRE equipment that could be Federally certified for use, in time for compliance with the newly enacted New Jersey law requiring same by January 1, Based on Judge Feinberg's findings, the Appellate Division decided to remand the matter to the Law Division in order to monitor compliance with the new legislation.
As I had predicted, and despite monitoring by the Court, the VVPATs indeed were not ready by and the Attorney General issued two 6-month extensions for compliance, also to no avail. In the meanwhile, a trial was scheduled and the Court ordered the State and vendor to supply voting machines and source code for examination. Information about the review and testimony in the and earlier hearings can be found at Professor Andrew Appel's website and also at the Freedom to Tinker blog.
On February 1, , Judge Feinberg ruled that the voting machines must be reevaluated to determine whether they are "accurate and reliable" and required that additional safeguards should be put in place to discourage tampering. The statement, which noted "there is simply no evidence to conclude that absent complete access, coupled with malicious intent to alter the results of an election, the voting machines have failed to correctly and accurately count every vote cast" also indicated that all voting systems have vulnerabilities, so New Jersey's unauditable machines seem at least to the Court to be no worse than other methods such as those involving paper ballots.
Unfortunately, the ruling did not go far enough to require that the VVPAT law in the state be complied with, so that there might be some actual proof that the machines were correctly and accurately counting every vote cast or not. And so it goes. Personally, I have felt strongly that the Plaintiffs' team was missing the boat by focusing on hacking rather than the Constitutional aspects of assuring verification and transparency in the election process.
Nothing is really proven by such attack demonstrations, other than that they could potentially occur -- since independent examinations of the equipment directly following the elections are routinely prohibited, we'll never be able to show that tampering was afoot. The greater likelihood is that malfunctions and misprogramming actually will and do occur.
These we have plenty of evidence of, and only with voter verified paper ballots is it possible to recover from and mitigate such problems. Perhaps someone else will try to sue on these grounds, when evidence of machine failure eventually surfaces. My response is attached here. The final version of the State Criteria is posted at http: The Attorney General's reports, also available via this website, in which she perhaps conveniently? You might think that since the AG did certify VVPRS for two other vendors' voting machines, the Judge might have required that these be used instead of the Sequoias, but no.
If you vote in New Jersey, here's what you can do. NJ has a absentee option where citizens can register to receive paper ballots in the mail. You will need to re-register as an absentee each year, but it is a great alternative to using the paperless DREs. Don't trust the Post Office? If you take your ballot to the County Election Office and drop it off there in its sealed envelopes during their business hours extended to the close of polls on election day , you'll know that at least your vote choices have reached the tabulation center, which is something that the DREs cannot assure.
- MPLS: Next Steps (The Morgan Kaufmann Series in Networking).
- Distributing the power of a government to enhance the privacy of voters.
- Distributing the power of a government to enhance the privacy of voters.
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In case of recounts which do happen in NJ these ballots are the only ones that can actually be checked without computer intervention. Writings by Rebecca Mercuri This section includes formal papers, commentary, articles, and other relevant materials on voting and computer security. The PDF versions for some of these writings may be more suitable for producing handouts. The title link here takes you to the thesis defense announcement and abstract. A PDF copy of the entire dissertation can be downloaded for free!
They various archival quality formats hardbound, softbound unbound, microfiche, and microfilm of the original double-spaced page document, they can take credit-card orders, and I'll receive a small royalty. Those who are manufacturing or evaluating voting systems will find it helpful to consider two additional lists of questions I developed as part of this thesis research. Some of the wording closely follows the Common Criteria, whose Level 4 assessment I have recommended as a minimum benchmark for voting system security. Further information about the Common Criteria and downloadable copies can be found at http: Mercuri and Peter G.
The footnote numbering is incorrect in the PDF version. See Conference Panels below. This succinct piece provides insight into the mathematics behind the voting system problem, in terms that a layperson can readily understand. A well-balanced overview of voting security threats and vulnerabilities along with an assessment of strengths and weaknesses of potential solutions. Herrnson, University of Maryland, This study, conducted prior to the Fall primaries, provides an early indication of machine failures with the Diebold equipment used in Georgia as well as Maryland. Chaum, the inventor of eCash, describes a unique method where voters can positively confirm their ballots, both at the polling station and also after the election, to be sure they are correctly entered into the tallies, without revealing their choices.
This groundbreaking work may eventually form the basis of secure and auditable future elections. A position piece against touch-screen voting from the Citizens for Legitimate Government. Comments on the November election, with his endorsement of the original version of Rebecca Mercuri's evote.
For further reading from Schneier on election topics use the Archives link at: If you think that direct-entry computerized voting machines are the answer to hanging chad, read this. A confirming follow-up on this story: This early study examines usability issues in various election systems, with the conclusion that newer technologies are not necessarily an improvement for voters. The pdf can be accessed via: Neumann has expressed his opposition to fully-electronic and Internet-based democratic elections since the early days of this debate.
His Risks newsgroup frequently prints reports of election problems, issues are archived at: This classic document contains highly relevant material for anyone researching or dealing with voting systems. This important Turing Award lecture explains precisely how it is possible to conceal nefarious programming such that it will never be found in a source code inspection. I and a room full of folks witnessed a vote flip during a certification examination conducted by Michael Shamos for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The vendor couldn't explain the "anomaly" but the exam continued.
Shamos certified the system for use! Here's a real one posted in Vote Flip on Machine. And there are more A lighter view of the punch card problem. I have created a private email group which I am using to send messages regarding updates to this website and other announcements about relevant articles, conferences, legislative activities, election litigation and my upcoming talks and media appearances.
The group is "send-only" so replies go only to me, not to the other group members. Announcements are sporadic, typically only a couple per month. If you are interested in joining, send an email to: Then follow the instructions in the reply message that you will receive, and I will place you on the list. If you join topica although you don't need to do this to be a mailgroup member , you can review all of the prior messages in the NotableVoting history list at their website. If you tire of the list, you can remove yourself from it by sending a message to NotableVoting-unsubscribe topica.
The wealth of materials at these sites may be helpful to those who are interested in voting technology. The links here are in no particular order and should not be construed as endorsements. The Electoral Integrity Project. People for Internet Responsibility.
Security concerns
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility. Foundation for Information Policy Research. The California Voter Foundation. A large push for this backdoor run around the U.